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711k m h l e  dircz~ses co~poiatc,oouPtnancclcc in Chiizo. It O U ~ [ ~ I Z P J  iht basic agrngl jrobl~til iiz 
C2lilrse lislrd con@oilics a d  qurstions the efferrti~,mrss of tlzc a n a r t  ti~~clmnirrr~s ~ t t $ l v ~ d  to 
ut$i~z~t  t f~t ir  stadards ofgou~1no11cc. h+o~tant!~~, it COIZ~;~'LTS ~ i t l~ l l l f i i i r  NIMIIJ thro~gh 
tt~lricl~ coipol-alcpac~ic z China can be 6rorqI1l inlo iitw zcith iiztn7lotioiml o.~p~ct(iiot~s and 
s l ~ w c s  dzr u7grng m'tfz wf7ich fhir lask 171uXt bc foc,i-l~d. Itcot~clua'es tllat r~ulators it1 Chino 
nttat cotlstiuct a co7;l,oi-nte~ouc11nncc ntor/~l i[:hicl~ is rortqa fiblo rc~itl~ its donlcstic srttiig ~ t l d  
not i 7 ~ ~ h  to ado/1tgoun7zancc iicitiatiucs n~ohll~doir d~ostr ill ct9u1.c.s tuIzicl~ a~cI;~ndarnnztol!~~ 
4if i~cnt  i.I tllc hoke of also ~-r~~arJilcug :Irei~- sucrpss. 
A. IXTRODUCTIUN 
h4a;:y- colllpany lawyers :\ill be familiar wit11 the Berle and Means analysis,l 
Angl~-~\meiican jurisdictions.? To mitigate the agency problenl between 
* Lecturer in Law, Rlaircl~ester Business School, Ui~iversity of hlanchester. 
':* Stlrdyi~lg for a P~ID at The Laxz~ Scllool, University oC?Ianchester. I\'e grntefdly ark~lo~~leclge the 
.-alual)le cotninents and suggestions made by t11e anonynloous referee. I\'e also thank Michael 
1 ,I Erl I t  ancl G hlcans, T/IC JIon'r771 Co7poi.ntion n11d Pn':nte Propopo* (New E'ork, Hnrcourt, Brace & 
I\To~,ici I lc, 1932). Despite its clotrli:allce in the study of c o m p n ~ ~ y  law, it i~ algred that die Berle 
ancl 5irnns t!:eoiy is IIOIV of limited rele\ance. Widely cIi?perserl o!\-nersliip of sliares is thc 
t.\cep~ic,i rachcr thaii dlc norm, pal-tici~ltlr in companies in ~011th e x t  .%in. It is IIOW also no 
l o t ~ ~ e r  obvious dlac \virlely clispeis:-rl shareholding \vill, in itself, lead to inferior tnot~itoring of 
rlircctot-s. See 1 hfacNeiI, "Adaptation and Cotlverge~ice in Corporate Go~wnance: The Case of 
C!lil~csc Lisreci Comparries" (2002) 2Jorrml ofCol;Do7nte Lnicl Srrrdies 289, 292. See also RL Porta, F 
. .- --- -- - 
. 
industry and the legal and accouxancy professions alI undertake an acti~-e role in 
setting appropriate stai~dards for directorial c o n d ~ c t . ~  
sharel~oldu~g with no clearly identifiable majoiiry shareholder. Typically, 
coizlpanies are cor~o!lecl by substantial slinreholdcrs,+ tvllo lnay be gro11ps of 
cotlll>anies, founding families or the state. Concellmation of o~vnersl~ip is e\iclent 
eve11 in large listed companies ~vliere control is sec~ired througll w a r n i d  
stl-uct~u-cs or cross l~oldir~gs aillolig fuiris. FaniIy o~\-rle~ship s prominent in 
more hal l  11alf of the coillpallies in south east Asia, notably LI Malaysia, Hang 
Iiullg and Illdoiicsia, wllcre the top 10 fanlilies can colztrol between 25 anrl 5096 
colnpanies ailloulltecl t9 just ~lnder  509,i.' Some !la:.c argued that this figwe k 
still only a consel\~ati~~e estlnate OF the control exerted by the stace, zs ir is likely 
that dle second arlcl d lbd largcst sllarellolders are also tinder its influence or 
~lirectioti.~ Aldlougll rhe nuniber of inr.cstors has scared ir. dze lasr 10 )-ears, the 
state still holds epprosimately two-thh.ds of the total issuecl shares in C h i ~ l n . ~  
3 OK Tam, "Ethical Issues ul the Evolution of Corporate Governance in Cllii~a" (2002) 37 jor~inn[ 
~fB~uiilt,ss Etftics 303, 309. 
G l\'alker and T Reid, "Ul>gmdulg C o ~ o m r e  Governatlce hl East rkia: Part 2" (2002) I7 Joemnl 
ofhrlrn~crlio~ml Bnnkir!,n Lrrru 96. These issucs are also cliscussed in L hliles, "C\'nking Up nfie~ tile 
1997 Filiwcial Crisis: Corporate Goveinance in Malaysia" (2004) 20flolrnrtrl of'btrnro/io~rrrl Bnt~X-ur~ 
Lair1 n~rd Regr~lntrio~l 2 1. 
Xlalaysia, the Pllilippi~lrs, Taiwan, . . Singapore alld Tllailand. 
b Ihid.~S&i~~Gri.iiic~i'iT;i~.~~~b~i,,-is;iij~~i~il :I : (r:;zc h ? d y  ~?r$:,~ersllip of coi11~l~ies S I ~ O W  that 
family gro111,s ill ;l[dn);sia and Hollg I<otlg cot>trol up to 78% of tord ntarket cal,i~disatio~;. Sek 
Clieung: n~om 11 2, 22. 
7 See GS Liit arid P Slrtl, "The Class of Shareholdings and Its Imlwct on Corporate Perfot~nnnce: 
C:umpositioi~ ill Chinese Public Coq~o~.a:ions" (2005) 13 Co,pomk Go;~rmo~~cc:.in b~tmm/io/rrrl Rez~ir;rl 
Ihi(f,5&51. 
"Trnn, supin t i  3, 306 ancl QQn~lg, "Co tpo~ te  Gocerrlance and State Owned Slm-es ill C11irl:l 
Lister1 Coml>a~iies" (2003) 14Birmcil of -&in12 Ecoi~o~~iics 7 7  1,  TTGf j .  
3uunzal of Coiptak Lazir Studies 
This article colisiders 'the extent to xvhich the duties of directors can be 
enforced effectively where tlie affairs of a colnpany are dolninatecl by a nlajority 
sliarclir~ldel: Cliuia pi-obides an interesting case study because, as niajority 
slinrcl~oldel; the state can not only nla~lipulate, but also directly control, the 
des,clo~~ment of corporate govcrnance and its enforcenlent to its own 
ad~antnge. '~ Against tlis backdrop, tllis article questions t l~e  extent to which the 
objective of ensurjllg proper corporate governance within its companies can be 
aclliexred. Section B provides a brief discussion of dle corporate governance 
fi-amex\-ork in Chilia and emphasises the powcr the state holds as majority 
shareholder ill listcd companies. Scction C examines the effectiveness of xalious 
c,ontrol lllecliatlisllls under Chinese law to ensure i-esponsihle standards of 
govcrnance within t l ~ e  company. Finall) Section D proposes solutions which can 
be adopted to enswe tliat companies are inanaged properly albeit retaining state 
control of them. It also considers specific xveaknesses in the Chinese governance 
rc@ne xvllich nlust be addressed ul-gently 
ti. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF  THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
IN CHINA 
The significant efforts put into ~ansforming thc planned ccononiy illto a market 
dle opportunities generated by globalisation. A central theme of t l ~ e  reform 
cr~tities hut were worhhops and productiorl units con~ol led ell&-ely I J ~  die 
r ~ n l  state." Tlie state ovrncd them, paid their n-orkers and detel-muled t l~e  pllces for 
:he 1 the goo& and scniccs they offered. It also funded their activides and appointed 
J !  1 ~ficials to n w n a g  them. 111 rullniug stare-o~med enterprises, these oficials 
? mel-ely elisured that the productioll plans or the gos-ernment were met: their ,all 
.he ~espo~isilrrility did not cstend to m n h l g  profit. hlcleed, starc-o;\-ned enterprises 
<.a. 1 \\.ere not commercial enterprises at all; racllel; tlley wrre Facrories ~vllich : 
I mt produccd goods and selvices a11d met targets set by the governmerlt. Xs a result, 1 tliey ivcre both unprofitable and inefficient.'? 
conveited them into corporations with -separate legal identities (an-aiigcments 
enterpiises is said to be the key to the success of China's economic Q O M T ~ . ~ +  
Mauy believed that corporatisation would i~nprovc productivity and 
performance and would allow state-owned enterprises ro generate income from 
other avenues ratlicr than continue to rely on government 1oar.s fcr s m v i d . ~ 5  
Tlley also perceived the setting up of corporations as afforclirig superior 
economic performanceI6 and attributed the rise and wealtll of westel.11 , 
ecollomics to the acthities of corpol.ations." At the ci:d of the 1930s a ~ l c l  early 
1990s, corporatisation was carried out on a pilot basis but, by tlie end of tlie 
decade, the goverrlinent had decided to pursue the policy vigorously Tllc 15th 
Coilgess of the  Chinese Con~n~unis t  Pai-ty (1997) stated that large ancl 
mecliuni-sized state-owled enterpi-ises sllould be corporatised ancl that the 
process of creating a modern e~iterpl.ise system should be sped up.I8 ivitlull a 
sllort period, the majority of state-owned enterprises lime hlcorporatecl. hfany 
wel-e converted into public conlparlies and were aMe to take adxnntage of the 
facilities on rhe S l ~ a ~ i g i ~ a i  and Sl~enzhen srock escllanges. The nun~ber uf listed 
cornpa~lies espancled rapicux as did the number of 1-csstered stock ~IIYPSIOIS." 
Today over 1300 conlpanies we listed on Cllitla's stock eschanges."' Virtuall)- all 
I J  For n 11Btoly or corporate go\-ernance ill China, set D Clarke, "Corpol.ate Go~.ernalrce it1 Cllirla: 
Xrl Ch,erview" (2003) 14 Cliikz Ei.o/~ortric Rmiezu 494 mcl M1' \Vri, "rln Ovewiew of Colyorate 
Govei-nance it1 Cliiiin" (2003) 50 Svmci~seJo~;mtrl oJhtm2at~o1icll La' mid Co/tu~tort 23. 
1-1 HW Hu, "Illtlependent Directors: A New Chaptcr ill  die Development or Colporarc Gol,crllanco 
'5 I\'&, srtpln r l  13, 23. 
'"ee the 3rd Plei l~~m of tllc I-kt11 Congrss of rlie Cllh~ese Comlnrtnist Party (CCP). Derisions 011 
Some Issues ill Est;ll~lisl~ilrg the Socialist hIni.ket Economic S y ~ e m ,  Noveil~btr 1993. ~\-llicll for 
the fmst tiale called hr the estal-rlishmenr of die n~oder i~  co~l,ol-atio~l a key nlensurt. hl Chills', 
ecol~omic reform, ernplimisi~lg die reorgal~isatioi~ of large altd mec[iuin sized stnrr-o~\.ilecl 
ii~~dersrantling its chnracterisrics arld to emulare A1glo--k1?ericao style go\.ernnnce in Cliil~n. 
'9 Tlle data horn Decemher 2004 ~1101~s clle t~il~llbel. OF 1istt:cI col~ll~allies a 137; nntl llie totxl 
11ut11Ler or registered stock ili\estors as i2.11-i3 rnillioll. See ~ I ~ ~ ~ : / / \ ~ ~ ~ ~ v . ~ ~ I ~ c . ~ o ~ . c ~ / c I I /  
Ilomcpagr/illdcs-et1.jsp, acccssetl 01) 15 A [arch 2005. 
Zo A1 four riatiol~d conlmel-cinl b a n k  are consideling gouig public; two of them hn\,e nficidly 
n~l~luuliced this bct  ant1 are uciclertakil~g prepnraro~y <\or-k to do so. One is now lisretl 011 rile 
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Fk I. The Structure of a T p i c d  Corporatised Stare-o\i-ricd Entcl.plise. 
Tolnpxl): state slinl-es i r ~  t21c s t i i~cquc l~ t  compnrly ~ rh ich  are held clilecrly by t l ~  state or 
. .~ l~nreho ld in~  cornpallies al-e known as "state-o~vned shares". (2) A compariy co-promoter 
. . . . . . , 
of these have been collvel-ted kom state-owled enterprises, and a substantial 
number are still under the control of the state. In  a s11ol-r: space of tinlt, die 
corporate laildscape in China had chaiiged remarkably." 
Despite the emulation of Anglo-American corporate practices, comliluilist 
ing many state-owned enterprises into corporations, and enabling a significant 
nrlmber of these to be listed, the state maultains control of them. Thcre are 
\al<ou reasons why the state has chosen to do so, but tile desire to maintain 
The facr tlint the state is majority shareholder in listed conipanic:~ has 
implicatious for Chinese corporate gover~lance.~~ When majority sharel~olcle~s 
doinitiate the \ray companies aiz run, it becon~es very &%cult to ch-deiige their 
actioils, \vlletlicr thsouglt internal or external mechanisms. The board of 
ckectol-s nlay be partial to them. blinority shni-eholders may fulcl thcb- rights 
a i d  interests harlmecl by majo1-i~ shareholders tvllo can ovellide their interests 
either rhrougll decisions of the board (\>-liich they control) or througll clecisions 
bl shareholder nleetings (~vllich they also contl-01 by t k u e  of tlleir voti11,a pot\-el-). 
blajority shareholders can influence major company decisions, collude \vi;i t l~ 
internal nlanageil~ent to share rents espropriated from minority sllareliolclers 
and esploit the finallcia1 I-esoiu-ces of the company to their o\m ac l~an t~ge . '~  
They nlny also view. the conlpnriy as a nlel-e extension of their interests ancl so 
approve self-interested transactions, r c f ~ ~ s e  to dcclarc dividellcls or forcibly 
purcliase the shares of minority shareholders at a price below diek U-ue 
-4s minority shareholclcrs do not have sufficient voting polvcr to a,eriicle the 
wishes of the n ~ a j o r i ~  they are uilnble to block tllcse practices. 
Controlling sharellolders are also in a position to nlaiiipulate external 
constraillts on corporate behaviow. For esa~alple, they can put pressure 011 those 
Hang Koilg Stock Esclmlige. See BBC Ne~vs~ "Cl~itia Bark hlakes HK Srack Debut", 27 Occober 
2005, n\,nil;lble at I1tcp://nr~~~s.bbc.co.uk/2/I~i/busi1~ess/~380278.sm~. 
" .4s (discussed in L Rlies, "The Implications or the Smte .u hlajoriry Sliarellolcler on Co~yolate 
Govei~lnnce in China" (2005) 8 S;ileet pplldl!la~2~~ll? C O I ) ~ N ~ Y  Lnu~ h'm~sitf~n I. 
"'-'.& S.5. ."ln;.ki.; I:!:@?(!. !1. 1 '3; 494. 
..r.> <. - . 
z3 011 the: bi~pot.tallce ot corjjb'ratc g~i . t i i~ i i , . i c  :D II~DC!~I-J.?L.-CC.~~~II.~,. seeCH Z!h~ lg. "Corpolstc 
Goc-enlance: J'\'liat Is Ir allcl JSlly* Does 1t hInrter to Cl~inn?", mailable at \r~r7i..dl)e.oi'g)i- - - - 
chi1la/p.l_chunli1.11h1~, accessed on 27 Jnnual~  2005. 
On the state as cocitrollitlg slmreholder UI listed conlpmics ill China, see 1t.G Zliarlg, 
Journnl oj'Co7porate Law Studies 
the co~~trollu~lg o~vmer did not ~ i s l l  this to happen. Its control car1 thus prevent 
the market fi-om acting as a corporate coiltrol mecl~anism, altllougl~ fi-oin a 
corporate gor7ernaizce perspective, d ~ e  co~lrrolling shai-ellolder may well keep its 
directors in check. Finally, oMnersl~ip concentration can lead to less transparency 
and disclosure in corn11all.j 1-eporti~lg. Minority sl~arel~olclers may thus not have 
the illfurmation they need to inake further lllvest~lleilt decisions. 
2. The Regulatory Framework Governing Directors in China 
-C me 
The intcrllnl gor.ernailce stlxcture proxided by the Chinese Corporations Law of 
China operates a two-tier board systcm, with a board of directors and a 
supei7-isoiy board. T h e  bonrcl of directors is resl~onsi~~le for managing tllc atX7h-s 
of those mectinp, decides the company's business and i~lvesrn~ent plans, and 
formulates its basic management s y ~ t e i i l . ~ ~  The supelvisoiy l>oard, which 
represclits the interests of employees and major sl~areholders,'~ reviews the 
finaticinl afiirs of rhe company, monitors tvhether dll-ectors have coinplied with 
La:$- 1993, hzlany of these duties are based 011 those foutld in Anglo-American 
\\ill incur liability foi- the resulting l o ~ ~ . ~ ' '  Articlcs 211 and 215 protide that 
directors ~vllo breach their duties ~ j i l l  be ordered to return to the company any 
assets belonging to it and any p~Ilis  \\.llich they h a ~ e  made as a consequence of 
Law 1993 \?.as recolitly amr~ltlecl. The new la\\- tool; erect 011 1 Janunnr 2006. \\llel.e reles.ni:t, 
m ~ ~ e ~ ~ r l m c n t s  arc Ilig!dightcrl ill this article. The Chinese version of't1)e new Coi1)oraiioils Lmv 
.- - --?- -- - .. ~ ~ 
, - .  
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that breach. They may also be cbscil~lhed by tlle company and contracts tvllich 
they have entered into in breach of their duties may be set aside. 
The Corpoi-arions Law 1993 confers on shareholders several powers cvhicll 
their remunei-ation, and 111aki11g decisions with regard to mergers, dissol~irions 
and company Iiq~idation.~"They may authoiise proxies to attend nleeti~lg of 
the coinpany and vote o n  their bel~alf.~' They csil also inspect company 
c locume~~ts .~~  Article 104 gives those holding i O %  or more of the compan)~'~ 
shares the power to request the b:tei-inl sharellolclers' meztiings to be comgellecl. 
F i n d 3  .k ic le  1.11 prokides dlat bdlere a resolution adopted by the shai~choldcrs' 
general coillmittee or the board of directors ~iolates statutes or ad~nlllisu-ative 
reg~~lations or jnfii~lges die rights and interests of shareholders, sharsholdcrs call 
bring an actiori to cl~allenge such acts. Llte~-estin~ls there are no pro\isions iu 
r l~e  Corporations Latv 1993 \v-hich alIo~v then1 to rat* the actions of directors to 
absolve tliern of ~ v r o n g d o l r ~ g , ~ ~  dtllougll in practice, &ere is no reason iv lq -  tllc 
power to clo so cannot be kn-itten into the articles of association. 
The Chinese Securities Re,platoly Conlmirtee (CSRC)+O is tile authority 
rcspoilsible for supelvising and regdating the securities lnarkets in China. 
Recently it il~trocluced guidelines to promote high sta~~darcls of ,aos.ernmce 
tvitllhl tlic coinpan>: The  "GuicIolllles for IntrocIuclllg Iiideperiderlt Directors to 
the Boarcl of Directors of Listecl Conipanies 2001"+' require dolllcstic listed 
coillpnnics to fdl one-third of their boarcl with independent directors." 
Independent directors owe clutics of good fiiith, clue diligence and care to~va-CIS 
the c0111pail): and alI the sharehcldrrs. They have a dut); to pi-otect the il~celrsts 
of the company, and inust be "especially concerlled \\<dl" protecting those of 
minority shareholders. They must also c x i y  out their duties independendj- .uld 
not sul3ject tllenisclves to the jl~fluence of the company's major sl~nrel~olclers, 
actual controllers, or interested parties.+j Being "hldepenclenr" means r l a t  the 
35 IDid, A t s  37 and 102. 
?"bid, Art 102. 
37 Ibid, kt 108. 
38 Ibid, A-t 1 10. 
See 11ttp://~~~nv.cIiii~ao1~li11e.con~/refe~/~ii~c~~p1~0~1es/CS~CL3.q Tor more ilifor~~lntioti. 
" T h e  Guirleliiirs call be ~ie\\-etl at ~i~w.cs~~c.go\~.ci~, nccessrci on 13 Ocroher 200-1. See iS1. L211, 
"Chiiin: CSRC's 'Guiding Opinio~l' on I~lclepelide~~r Di -ccto~s of Listed Conlpa~iies-;\.liotl~~~~- 
First for China" (2003) 24 771~ Cbni$m:v h r w r  279. J' G~~iclelir~es, A-tI(3). 
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Table 1: Introduction of Initiatives Related to Corporatisation and 
Corporate Governance in Chima 
Gover~l~nental Action 
Initiation ofl-eforrn and nrl "opening up" polic)~. 
Alnriagers were atlowed more autonomy it1 rullni~lg 
their erlteqxises 
ExperLnenu with coq~oratisntioll. The opening of thc 
Sliangllai & Sl~eilzhe~l stock exchanges 
Establislinicnt of rlle CSRC 
111troductio:l hy rhe CSRC of Rules on Illfomlation 
Disclosilre ill [lie E\.e11t ~FIllitial Tublic Olferiilgs. 
Intxoductioll of Provbioird Regulations on rile Issuulg of 
Stock and Trading 
Formal promulgation of rl~e policy of corporatisation by 
the Cliinese Cornli~ul~ist Party. Enacrment of the 
Coll)orations Law 1993 
Cuq~oratisation oF!al-ge and mediutn-sized stare-o\+.ned 
companies. The process of creatit~g a moclenl ellrz~-prisc 
system \\.as spcecletl up. Introcluctioll by the CSRC of 
Guitlelines for Articles ofrhsociation for Lhted 
Co~nl~anies 
E~~actnicnr and in~plcmentntion of the Securiries 
Adoption of rhe Guidelines lor I~~troducklg Iliclepemlctlt 
Direcrols ro the Baal-cl ofDuectols orLired 
Requirements Gob-emir~g Sl~areholders' General 
Rlcetil~gs 
Inti-oductio~l by the CSRC of the Code of Colporate 
Governance for Litecl Compa~lies. Formal decision on 
the part of the state ;hat aprr kom a iew that \\.ou!d be 
kept in the form of one-pelson cal~~pnnics, dl smte 
o\v~~ed nte~-priscs wo:~ltl be co~~~urnrisctl 11-it11 mirltiple 
shrn~rholtle~s 
Estnblisl~me~:; o!';hc St:.:e-O\\-ncd Assets Sul;elvision 
ancl Adrninist~-;ltiorl Commission of clie Scnte Coullcil 
(MS.4C) 
Refom1 to adtlress tlle problems caused by the 
rlon-tradability of shares in lisrecl companies 
Anendment of the Coll>orations Law 1993 and of the 
Securities Lax\, 1998 
the interests of mhlority  shareholder^.^^ The Guidelines obligate the company to 
cooperate with h i  and to "acti%-elf' proside him with assistance by furnisllhlg 
information and docun~ents.~' 
C. EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE M CHANISMS 
Good coi-porate goverllailce necessitates that tile baarcl acts in the best interests 
of t l ~ c  conlpany and -behave 111 a responsible and diligent malinei: In 
Anglo-Anlelican j~u-isdictions, t l ~ e  task of monito~h~lg t I ~ c  conduct of directors 
aild ensuing good governance witllitl conlpanies is undert,zke~l bj; i~lrer din, 
ir~clepenclent directors, shmliolders, tlle capital market, the media and corporate 
govel.narlce codes. Howevel; due to fundamental differences 111 corporate culture; 
not all of these governance mechanisms call be relied on to promote good 
goverllance in China. Ironic,dy it is the state as majority shareholrler ~vliich 
stal~ds in the way of tile various coi-porate mechanisnls fi-om operating 
effectiveIy IVhere the state co~rrols  tlie appolntmel~t and czllplo!ment of 
directors, and is willing to ratify their conduct, these is l i d e  poult in int~oclucing 
a legal fi.aillet\.ork to regulate hec to rs  to raise levels of governance. I1hr:n the 
!n\v does nct take n l i r lo r i~  sha-eho1del.s seriously, they cannot pa~~icipate in :he 
goverllnilce of the compan)! i,Yheii nlonicors cf ina~iagernent are also appointed 
by the majority sl~areholdei; ir is unrealistic to e q e c t  tllenl to clisregai-d its wishes 
when s~~pcivising maIlagemellt. Finall?; \\.hen tlle judicial system is underde- 
veloped, the courts cannot set standmds to guidc the conduc~ of clh-ectors. This 
sec~ion will consider the effective~iess of existing corporate go;.ernance 
~~tec l l a r~ i s l~~s  to ensure proper directorial conducr listed colnpaliies in Cliina. 
1. Ambiguity o f  the Law 
" See ibid, Arts I( xntl HI. 
.'"bid, rb t  V, 
4% I6i11, A t  11. 
'" lhirl, k t  VII. The  rccluiirement to recruit indepsnclenr cli1,ectors is now inco~porated illto the 
Colyomrioi~s Law 1993. See C:orporntions LIW 1993, .+t 123, as an~endecl. 
. .  - . .  
beha~iour if the majority shal-eholder is willing to ratify breaches of duties by 
cljlcctors. Until tl~is fundamental problcm is overcome, any evaluation of ho\v 
effecu~e the legal fi-an~e~col-k is in setting appropriate standards of collduct \\ill, 
to a large ex-tent, only constitute all academic exercise. This apart, inally of the 
pro~isio~is on rhe duties of directors under the Coi-poi-atio~ls Larv 1993 are 
- kafred in an ambipous manner. For esample, the law states that directors may 
not engage in activities which ai--e detrilllcntal to cornpail): But 
"clcb-inlental" actilit). is not quandfied. Neirliel- are "conlpany u~terests"; do tllcy 
mean the interests of the coimpany as a business entity or the interests of the 
bod?- of s11areholde1-s as a ~vllole? The law also prollihits the giving of company 
nsseIs as secru-it). for the debts of i~tdividuals'~ but (lot, it appears, of entities. 
\Vhat i s  the ratio~lale for clistin~~isliulg benveen ulclividuals and entities? The 
Corporations L ~ t v  1993 further pro\icles that directors may not seek personal 
gains ailsing out of their positiorl and autl1ority.5~ Again, in the absence of more 
specific guidance, it is difficult to h~llo~v t llat this meatls. Ceitain actiorls may be 
bcileficial to the company but may also, at the same tulle, advance tllc persoilal 
interests of tllc How sho~dlld di-cctors act in these circumstatlces? Tlie 
amhig~ous manner in ~i"llich these provisions are &afied not ~ i d y  rn,&es it 
makes enforclllg thc k r v  a difficult task.j2 
The same can he said for the pru\Gions on the lights of shai-eholders. Article 
10-f pi-olcles that ultea-ini mcetulgs can bz corn-ened ~ d l c r e  shareholders holdiiig 
at lcnst 10% of the compa~ly' stock request one to be convened. The CSRC 
a nlceting to be com.ened mtrst frst  make a proposal to rile board for it to do so. 
these meeting3 valid?55 Tlle Corporacioils Law 1993 is silent on this issue, 
nlthot~gh the 1997 Guidelines unply that they are valid.56 Guidelines issued by 
'3 Corporntions La~w 1993, Art 6 1. 
4" Ibid, ..kt 214. 
See, eg the ckct!!~lsral~rw nl R r ~ c l  Hostifzgs;~ Grrliir-?- [I9671 2 ;\C 134 ui the UK. 
" Conqxtre and colamst rilis \\-ell settled case la~v and lepl regulatiol, in rile UE;, ie Re Cifil 
Eqi~ifo6le Firr Insrlro~lie [I9251 C11 407, Jhnnor~ ir /?codore Godairrd [I99 11 BCLC 1038, RP Dynn f 
Lan~iorr [I9931 BCC 646, Re B(ir;tlzs PLC [2000] 1 BCEC 523 rulrl Insolvency Xcc 1986, ss 214-15. 
legal significalice is thus u~iclear. 
more of the voting rights may do However, they go on to provide that me11 
when resolutions have been proposed, directors may still decide not to consider 
tllem a i  the general m e e t i r ~ s . ~ ~  I n  effect, shareholder resolutions can be ignored 
by the dl-cctors. As a resldt, it k futile for shai-cholders llolding less than 10Yo of 
the votiilg rights to propose resolutions; without dle lo?& shareholditig, t l l c ~  !+-ill 
be ~mable to convene a separate meetbig to consider these re~olut ions .~~ This is 
an  unnzcessmj1.y bi~rdcnsoille proxision. The ability of sl[l,u-ellolda-s ro collsine 
mectinp and pass resolucioils is important in a culture U e  that in China, \~.lici-e 
the state sbai.cholc1er holcls a disproportiorlatc aiilouiit of the shares in n 
company From a cynical point of tien; cvllelr a majority eserrs significant 
influence over the c o n ~ p a i i ~  it 111il)l not illattei- veiy mucli whether or not 
minority sh~eho lde r s  are al~le to coiivene a meeting or propose a resolution. But 
the ability of minority shareholders to do precisely these can help inform orher 
sh~eholclers of what is happening in the conlpaily. L-onically, allowing minority 
' 
shnreholders to propel-ly convene n nleetillg or  propose a resolutioii nlay also 
bring tc the attei?tion of the mnjorir). shareholder matters i ~ l ~ i c h  d ~ e  ch-ectors 
(xvhom the); have appointed) are concealing fro111 tllci11, or matters \\-l~ich they 
are ignorant about. 
&tide 11 1 criables shareholders to bring ail action to c h d e ~ l g e  clucctorid 
behaviour xvhicll brcaclles the law or xvhich liarills :heir rigbts and intercsrz. It 
'?\'here a resolution adopted by the shnreliolders' gerlcrnl meeting or tlie I~oard of 
clirectors violates the relevant ~latio~lal statutes 01- administr.ati\-e I-rgilations, or 
infinges 011 the 14gIlts and interests of the shal.el~oldel-s, n sllnl.el~oldzr is entitled to 
I~ri11g a suit to the People's Court to enjoin such illegnl act or infri11,oirig act." 
By \va!. of contrast, see Conlpnnies Act 1985, s 368 ill the Uli, I\-llicli clotlles suc l~  rneeriilg5 \\-itli 
legal authori~j: 
57 G~~iclelilles, Art 57. Ep \say ofcontrast, see Compx~ies Act 1?85, s 376 in rhe UK. 
58 C~ii~lelitles, ihts 59 alid GO. 
51 See Cu~l~orations 1993, .Art 104, as discusserl 011 p 222. 
. -- . . . , , 
.~rrarua.Znneru alu.rocLro3 ~srr&e A~CI a111 jo III~IU~~JOJ~I~ ~rar[S~~a.ns 01 sdms $001 'pas!~rl!S~u 
Suraq u1o.g siaqmur y~ols lrra.\a.rd 01 '1r~atuo~a.~o8 asaqrl3 arll 'i.00~ 1: sa~l~d s.ru~[s JO 
Srr~larrrinn!d yunrr!)rlo> arp puu naqnn.al q~ols arp rro pa.rxn>~o a.\crI ~stl~ spprmss arlljo A\>!.\ ti1 ,, 
'~LZ OLIXJ~~ OI~ 1e.zLazmq p1~) rti1ud11103 
IUUV:JU~LLYI~ 31 (~00;) cca.lninj arp .IOJ saBrlay[nqj :urcrl3 111 sa!nrd~rro3 pals!? rl! srqqorja.rurls 
kyorqy 30 qsala~rrl ~IIE ~1118~ arIi 51r!lsalo~g., 's~ jy prrt. ssp~y 7 n! ~XSS[I~SI[I S! S!I[J. Og 
~r~oddu 01 .~sp1or1a.~eys kp.ro~~ru s aw3s arp jo .kqqe 3q3 aqdsaa ~s.r~p~or~a.~ur~s 
&!.rof~rrr JO 210s arp a.ru sa!rrodmo:, 2u!pror1a.1urls .ro slrraru~r~dap Iemarurr.~s.~o.$ 
,.= 
z7x~~ arp jo seam sarpo B~~.rojrra r! urr!rID rr! 6eld sue2.10 
a.IT.i!lr.usyr?rrqx a101 pmua3 arp ~3.13 's~o.? SF sq~ .r[~Jr ~3npuo3syru [e!.raS~ucrrr 
-103 Lpamar ou aq Leu a.rarp 'S.IOJ~.IT~ 30 I-IV~ aqj rro alopqaqyrrr ~rr%p~oC!t[ 
03 sm-103 arp U! UO~L'S~~ 01 3.10sa-r ~ou op s.rapIoqs.1vrIs JI -nlq suoy~e.rod.ro3 
ayl rpva.rq orp SIOJSS.?~ 3soq3 Sufnssnd JOJ alqysuodsa.~ sy Apoq sgqucK 
qs!r~.&\ JEaIsun Ira,ia.no~ ,;s!rpjo ssldrrrcxa ~J~V.IOC~S an a.rarp (pa~prr~ .rratp 
alnoaso.16 rrns ~JUIS alp ra3~~a~o ~~U!LZT~.IS E sa~nqsrros PIBOC[ ayj jo j.n?cI at73 , 
rro .mo,wtIaq JI .sLro33a.rtp 30 sqnp arp Bms.ro~rra ~oj aiq!suodsa.r 2.r~ alels ay1 jo 
auatrn.redap ~IJ~I" -103app~o~d lorr saop £661 A\V~ SUO!IL'.IO~~O~ arp Knt3rr~d 
,,s(rredrrro3 aql jo pr~aq uo ~r~Sno.rq s! qgr1.&1 arro 'rro!lsu 
a:iya~~!.~ap asr panusnos aq ppo3 UO~~E arp j! .TO paStrrqrq are .lapIoqa.reqs 
arp 30 slqS!1 pos~acl arp rraqM X~uo 1y2nosq aq 01 ST uopx aq3 15T13521!\\ 
r?eLtaJrrn s! I: Ira~1.m~ ~pa~~snaduro~ acl .rapIoqa.rerys &;r.~oup arp p~ ;p~p.r~.~x 
aq Lurcr sapaura.1 Icrp 'rnjssa3ms s! uopso arp 31 .rropu2qq jo slso3 arp 6rcI 
' 
~snm myl 41 01r-q~ LO palsnuyxa aq 4s-n~ asntu saparuas @u.ia~y say~arp .reapr~n 
osp q 11 .uo!~su arp Brn.tq Xurrr xapIoqs.turls ay~ rp!zlnl .rapun srroTJrprro2 arp 
sn?pnf,y mq 3~~~0@3/0 ~vruna[ 
find and employ only the most able and hig13y skilled individuals. In  many cases, 
directors tllemselves have associates in the Conlmunist Party as well as in 
govcl-nmenral deparunents and derive support f?om them. As such, they have no 
fcm- of being disnlissed for ~lzisn~ailagen~ent or embezzlement. i t  also coines as 
no surprise that many directors can enhance their p e l - ~ o i ~ d  fin~acial  position 
significantly in a short time, althougl~ ghir may bc that they have to surre~idcr pait 
of hell- financial gain to thejl- "cronies" &om the inner 
The other difficiJty is that as d ~ e  state does nor have a pl~ysical presence 
within companies, it is uilable to prevent nesligence or abuses of power from 
O C C U ~ I - ~ ~ ~ ~ . ; . " ~  All abscnt shareholder cannot nzo~litor the activities of the b ~ m c l . ~ ~  
71b overcome this problem, the state appoints agents or representatives to 
exercise ownership rights (which includes the llght to nlonitor dieccors) 011 its 
behalf. But, not being tlie typical prix-ate owner \+ith all ultel-est in how the 
coinpaiqr is  performiiig, tlley have no irlcelltive to esercise these rigbts 
respo~~sibly and prudently. I n  fact, niany sucll ag-ents do not \let\- exercising d~eh-  
rights ill a way which increases the wealth of the conlpany as a priority 0011 the 
coilwar): because of their partialin. to state matters, they may be illore 
coilcerlled with issues such as presel7.in,o jobs ~ I I  t.llc11. respective ju~-isdictioxis.~~ 
The lack of effectiw monitoring of d ~ e  board steins h i  a lack of proper 
co~iti+ol by the state over irs agents or representati~~es. As a consequence, rheie I ulll 
agents and represeiirativss ha:e no b~ceiith~e to monitor the board. M b r s ~  still, 
they inay abuse col1t1-01 rights for their owill 
3. The Effec&veness of the Supervisory Board 
TIlc sul~eivisoiy board also plays onl~.  a very limited I-ole in Chiria ul c~isuring 
proper conduct on the part of d i rec to r~ .~Vl~ i~za ' s  two-tier board system has 
. -. . . :.- -. 
---* r 
--=>..^___ :- . 
and YC Tse, "Col-ponce G o \ ~ r n a ~ ~ c c  in China: E~hirnl and Legal P~.oM~IIx", a\-ailable st 
~nv~v.clepartme~lrs.bock~~ell.etlu/~natlagetnent, acc ssrtl on 31 October 2004. 
" 17\'\2'ei, ".4 Cllu~ese l'erspecri;.e 011 Corpomte Governance" (1992) 10 Bo/~dLr,atRmim~ 363. 376. 
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board of directors and supervisoly boards. Neither is accountable to the ot11el-; 
they f ~ ~ n c t i o ~ ~  011 an equal level. Given the rationale for having supel-cisoly 
direct013 in con~panies (that is, to  non nit or tlle board), one would have thought 
tlic polver to hold the board accountalle should lie in t l lei  hands. ~ w r e n ' t l ~  if 
the board of directors disl-egards their demands to rectify a pvticular action, the 
ICS as proposal to do so, the supe~~<so iy  board may com7ene tlle meeting itself" Ex.en 
clisi~~issecl." Eut again, if the majority sl~areholder does not support their 
proposal, the supel7-iSory boa1-d will be unable to discipline the hoard. 
~'es to h-Iarly supei-,isoiy directors also haye suolig affiliations with the state.j3 One 
clanger ii tl~is is that thcy may be inched to pl;omotc and protect state interests 
In idle par,-er or neglect or ens~u-e that directors al-e disciplined. Fin,dy; few supel-,isoly 
more clircctoru possess the necessary espcricnce and expertise in matters of law, 
accounriilg and finance to cai-IT out their re~ponsibilities.'~ I11 part, this is 
csnccd)ated by the fact that the m x h t  Tor supeivisory directors is small and 
uilderdes~el~ped.'~ TI-airling schenles and pi-ofessionally qualified organisations 
organisations such as the Institute of Directors, tlle National Association of 
Pcnsioli Funds and rhe -4ssociation of British Insurers pro~ide educatioll and 
traitling and stipulate the sta~lclards cspecred of directors so that they may 
discharge their duties eff~ciently and resp~nsibly .~~ 
'0 C:oq,orntior~s Law 1993, Art 54. 
. The rigl~t o clo so became erective on 1 J;lnual-j 2006. See Col-pomtions LTW 1993, r t t  54Y-k) as 
'? Ibiri. See Corporatio~~s Law 1993, t h  54(2), 54 (6) and 152, as amentlcd. 
73 See J Dal~ya, \i R;11-bllat-i .uld JZZ -Xao. "The Supenison Board in Cl~jliese Lister1 Col~>pa~~ies: 
Problcnls, Causes, Co~lseque~lces and Re~;ledi~s" (2002) 9 :llrin Par$( BII~IIFJS h i f i u  118, 125, 
. . .  . 
4. The Role of Endependent Directors 
corporate 501-ernance in thel: companies. Ironically, the biggest stumbling block 
board and shareholders who solely or collectively hold more than 1 % of issued 
shares of a listed company may nominate persons to be appointed as 
independent dkectors. Needless to say, it is tlle majo~ity sharellolder ~ l i o  call 
determine who is nominated or appokited. But if independent cbectors arc to 
protect the overall interests of tlle conlpany and "be especi<dy conccriied with 
protecting f i e  interests of minority sha~el~olders"," sliould they really be 
appointed by niajollry sl i~eholders? For the same reason, it is UIU-ealistic, to 
expect them to usefully supelvise affdiated transactions between majority 
shiu-el~olclei-s and the con~pany '~  Further, their renlui~eration must be approved 
by the sliarellolders in general n~eetiug.'~ Again, this \\ill depend on tlze sates of 
the majoriry shareholder. Bur it ma); be difficult for an llldepericlent director to be 
critical if 11c knew that the nlajority shareholders had the power to approve his 
reniuncration. I t  is also idealistic, in this case, to expect him to be able to ehyress 
an independcnt opinion on events which he considers to be de~hlzental to tlie . 
interests of minority s h a r e h ~ l d e r s . ~ ~  
Secorid); introducing illdependent directors into a system lvllel-t. tllel-e i- 
already a s u l ~ e n l r o ~ y  boxcl nzny be problrmatic. 'iV11at is the relarionshir, 
between thc board of supelvisors and tile independent directors? 1s  one 
Thirdly, and most importantly, t l ~ e  culturc in Cllii~a mif not Icncl itself 
to facilitating the use of llldepende~~t directors as monitors of the board. An 
i~ldeperldent director must be inquisitive and il~ust not be ah-aid to ask 
penetrating questions. H e  niay have to, on occasions, speak his mind and "rock 
the boat". He must ca-1-y out his rcsponsililities autonoilzously, free fi-om the 
ilifluence of coritrolling share~~olde~-s and other llltcrestecl parties. Bur all of 
these traits may be sie~ved as assertive and antagonistic in a culture ~vllicll is 
Ib id , .hY .  
Ibid, . k t  \,TI (5). 
$0 Ibid, Art \T. 
EE Lehmail, "I~~depcnclent Duectors: !\'ill the New Regulations Improve Chila's Corl~orare 
Go~en~ance?" (2001) 8 Copomtc C b i ~ r r ~ t l  29 and Jk- Zllu, "Tlie Liab'iit). of Ouuidt: Din-c~ors ill 
Corporate Go~znlance: .A Gonlparative Study, Pan 2" (2001) 3 Pccpntiws, a\ailat)le at 
I~tt~~://~~~~'~~.~ycf.~r~;/Per~pec~ives/ 15- 123 10 1 /contents.htm, accessecl on 12 December 200.1. 
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shares are released from the conb-01 of rhc state and allow~d to be freely waded 
on a strong and functioning market, there may not be an  effecuve market for 
coi-porate conw01.~~ 
111 Au,wt 2005, die Chinese government initiated refor~li to address the 
problems caused by the non-wadability of state shares. The core of the reform 
process was that liolclers of non-tradable shares can, in exchange for die 
opportuility to trade on the stock eschange, compensate holders of tradable 
shares for this privilege. The level of conlpensation is deterniined through 
liegotiation between the  two qyes  cf s h ~ e l ~ o l d e r ~ . ~ ~ o  avoid v latile price 
fluctuations caused by the sudden YIRLLY of tradable shares on rlie stock markets, 
the law provides that non-tradable shareliolders holdiilg more than 5% 
non-tradable shares in a company cannot sell more that1 1 O ? 6  of hose shares 
rvid~in 3 years after rl~ey become tradable.8' At the end of October 2005, 
norl-tradable shares ceased to '  exist in approximately 150 Chinese listed 
companies." It is anticipated that the problenls caused by the non-tradabiliq of 
shares will diminish qriickly. It may well be the case that state o>vnersliip of 
shal-es call also, in the013 be solcl to private itlr-estors on dle open niarket, b 
leading to a fairer market for corporate control. 
6. The Role of the Judiciary in Corporate Governance C :  
Judges can play an inlportant role hr corporate go\-ernance, for esa~lly,le by I jl 
making a i d  cla~$ing tlie laiv goxri-~iiag db-ccmn. Bur dley can o111y do so if 1 ::. 
they are properly cpdified, axid can escrcise their role jlldepc~ldelltly and 
itltbout fear of repl-isal. It is usefill :o illlotrate the role thc judicial7 ca:1 play in 1 ( 1  
1 
enforciilg proper standards of directorial behaviour byxeferencc to tlic jucliciai?; I 
ill the UR, w1iel.e their exq~erience is lligllly valued and where they play a ccnrial 1 li 1: 
role in sllaping tlie content of the law regulating directors. 
C JucIgcs in tlie UK are appointed fiam the r a n k  of successful lawyers. They 
are well respected, highly qualified and esperierlced. They face cox~siderakle 
c pressure to pei.fonn well, as theh- juc1pnlents are subject to scrutiny They are also 
well paid, their salaries reflecting t h e i  experience and the contribution they 
85 hlacNeil, n@i? n 1, 322 and Tam, stpm n 3, 310. 
8"ticle 3(8), s!@m 11 83. 
C7 kbticle 5, Notice 011 Issttes Col~cen~lllg tl:e Esperimerlr of Reform of Non-Tradable S!mres in 
- . .  . 
Joinnal ofCoti!~oratt LAW Studics 
share their exl~erience with them, especially with the passing of new legislariori 
~vhich may influence the way cases a r c  decided in the future. Most in-~poi-tandy, 
the juclicia~y is' itldepcllderit fro111 the governme~lt. Judges elljoy secui-ity of 
tenure and cannot be removcd by the esec~~tivc ~ 1 -  legislature. By the same tokeri, 
they car1 review tlle decisions of other branches of gox.ernment, axid declare 
tllcll- dccisiolls invalid if clee~ized to have been made in conh-a\:ention of the 1mic 
The Chi~lese vie~v tlicu- judicial system as nierely another bureaucratic body 
s\-Ilich is part of the stzte. Despite the fact that there are over 200,000 judges *I1 
China, they are nlerc civil servants ~ \ h o  have little legal educatioil or training. 
TI-aditionally, they were appointed for political reasons. They are not regaided 
~\itlz respect. It is not mlusud for cou1-t.s to decide not to deal a particular 
mattel; regnrcli~ing it as being beyond their competence and instead referring it to 
anot l lc~ brallcb of gos~er i~ment .~~  Courts are also 1-eluctarlr to iniplemeiit or 
enforce their j u d g ~ ~ c n t s  (especially tllose imohing coei-cive menswcs) against 
stare-o~ined enterprises if they \+-ere responsil~le for the same locality or if their 
juc l~~ l lmts  would lead to the closure of the enterprise and unenlploym~ent of 
, 
I\-ol-kers."J~~dges in China also lack security of tenure. Article 36 of the Organic 
L n ~ v  of (he People's ~ c u i - t s  a d  Article 63j.1) of t l ~ e  Constitution of the PRC 
130th prmide that tllcy 111;ly be removed 60111 ofice. But neither tile 3-ounds for 
reino\,al 1101- the limits set or1 this poxver of rtnzovd are specified clearly 
In ~.ecogiising the ilced to the judiciary, and ellcourage inore 
~spe~icllcecl  judges into office, thc Cllinese gosei-nmcnt is overha~ding the 
pi-ofessional training. Axtide 9(2) of Tlle Judses Law 1-eyuires judges to have at 
least 2 years' w-orhlg experience 111 law and a ~~niversi? degree it1 law 01. a joint 
lasv degree. Tlle Supreme People's Court 11014: also requires judges under the age 
of 40 xvho do not possess an undergnduate clegee to gnu1 this qudification 
~\irllin 5 years. Judges above tllc agc of 40 must uaclcrtLake tl special legal training 
cou-se lasting bcnvcen G and 12 months. 
The judiciary in China has not plng-ed a cl>namic role 111 c1el.elopinp a body of 
linv to guide directorial belia\ioul: IVith the lluillbei- of businesses gmir?g at a 
rapid rate and sharel1oldel.s being in~itecl to invest in the count13 ~ is illiperatix-e 
tlmt thc government acl&ess this issue. SignZcant finailcia1 and hu~nan  resources 
tent-i 360 13G.l1trn]. 
- -. .. 
litigants and lawyers.g2 
D. THE WAY FORWARD 
mechanisms to promote good corporate governance are inadeqaate. To iilprove . 
corporate governance, it may be that the state ~ v i U  need to relinquish its 
donlinant positiorl in its conipanies. The argument is that until ownership of the 
conlpany is given over to private owners, corporate governance will not h~'~prot,e, 
For political reasons, however, it is unlikely that the Chinese government M;iU 
substantially divest itself of the ownership of shares in the foreseeable future. It 
is anticipated that state ownership of shares will remain dominant in Clinese 
colnparlies for a long time to come. To reduce the agency problems inhel-ent in 
state ownership, therefore, one may need to look for other solutions to sn.en@en 
corporate governance. The rest of the article considers mechanisixs xvhicll have 
been instituted in other jurisdictions to promote governance in state owned 
corporations. Some ways fol~vard may be to strengthen the rights of minol-iry 
shareholde?-s so that they call participate in governance issues within the 
compan); encourage institutional shareholder activism, link directolid 
renluneration to performance and issue debt to create a class of private in\-estors 
~ ~ 1 1 0  can provide an additioxlal layer of n~oni to r ing .~  Given that these 
nrechanisn~s have been proposed to cuxe governance problems in econonlies 
which share similar characteristics to that in China, it inay be possible t o  
implement them in the Clhese context. 
1. Strengthexkg the Rights of Rlinority Shareholders 
Currently the role played by minority shareholders in Chinese corporate 
govei-nance is negligible. Given that the state as majority shareholder is unable to 
.. . . . . . . 
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for die fisr tirnc, a mu~oiity shareholder conllllellced a deril-ative action against 
has not yet issued anv judgment. The media has also been swangely silent. 
The Corporations Law 1993 was recently amended to cla~ify the 
circun~stance~ under \vl~ich shareholders nlay bring a derivative action.lO' The 
ainerlded law provides that sliai-e11olde1.s \vllo individually or jointly hold more 
than 1% shares of a company ma): bring sudl an action, but dley should fust 
clirectors) or board of clkecrol-s (where tlle action is against supelvkoly hectors) 
to pursue an action against the other. If either board fails to do so, shu-cholders 
call conllllence a derivative action. Regrettably, the law is still silent on the issue 
of who bears dle cost of litigation. The 1% tlu.eshold is also arbitray. Vely few 
sllareholders tvould hold the number of shares required, especially 111 a listed 
company Furtbcl; it is curious w11y a shareholder tvislling to conlrllence a 
dericative action must watt 180 days before being able to do so. This nlenns he 
cannot bring a11 action immediately after he fir~ds a xiolatioll of thc larv but 
would 11ct\?e to wait fc:. a significallt period of rune to pass. For delivative actions 
2. Xustitutional Shareholder Activism 
10: ; 111 the west, lllstirutio~lal sl~areholclers t4ke a keel1 interest in ensuring proper 
behavioul- on tlle part of directors in order to safeguarcl their stake in the 103 : 
company Indeccl, activism on the pm-t of institutions in the LTK and US in 
secuu-hlg goocl go1,ernnnce in tlleir cornparlies has been applauded arid admired. 
Institutioilal shareholders call exert pressure on clu-ectors to act in a responsible 
and eff~cicilt manner. As rhey lnve considerably more resoru-ces and inflr~erlce 
threats to seU their shareholding in the company may have ad\-erse i~llplicatiolls 
'OD Sue reports hy S!mg/~ilni Stctlritia d\>rda 0 1 1  22 July 2004, availnbls ar llrtp://\~~nv.cllsrot-l;.com/ 
cjs~vz~/ssgs/t?004072~-610319.1itm $11 Chitlese), acccssed 011 5 November 2005. 
'01 See Co~-polatiorls L i w  1393, ,Art I53 zs amended. 
positioned to assess directorial conlpetence and apply pressure to secure 
Long-tcrm (as opposed to spcc~dativc) investlllent wodd prevent the volatile 
fluctuating of share PI-ices.lo3 After the bubble burst in 2001, and ~vl~len private 
illdisiduals ~ i t l ~ d r e w  fh~n lllvesting on the stock markets, the go\rernmcnt was 
a~lsious to fir~d ~vays to channel full& into tI1c markets to coullter tllc do~inward 
mosTement of share prices. As a result, foreign itlstitutiolls were d o ~ v c d  to irlvcst 
these funds alone accounted for 13% of the total value of traclal,le sliarcs.'" It is 
eslwcted that in a short period of time, institutional investors in Chitla will attain 
a letre1 of *Illpol-tance comparable to heir western counterparts. II~ order to play 
a pronlinent role in monitoiulg dir-ecto~ial behxiour howevel; institutio~lal 
Chinese government is holvevel; still vely cautious about pei-mitting Forcigl 
investment. Cyl-ently, foreip institutional investors must obtain app~-o\~al from 
. <  . . --. 
a\.ailable nt I~rtp://11e\~s.xii~l~iia11et.com/fo1t~11~e/2OO246/O7/cot~~~1~t~+28778.l1t111 (in Chinese), 
accessetl or1 5 No\.ernber 2005. 
1Q.I See "'Temporary Pro\.kions Co~lcerni~lg the Repiation of Domestic In\.estn~e~lcs of QnliGed 
Foreign I~lstitutional I~lrestors", issued by the CSRC and the C e ~ l d  People's Bank of Chi11a on 7 
N3vember 2002. 
l 1 t t ~ : / / n e w s . . ~ l h u a n e t . ~ o m / s t o c k / 2 0  (LI Chinese), accessed on 
G November 2005. 
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introducing peiforinance-based conlpensation enhance governarlce standards in 
Chinese listed companies? Indeed, there have long been calls for dle introduction 
of performance-based compensation, including stock options, in China.'?+ 
Howeve]; currently, dkcctors have little incentive to work to earn ihk 
coi~lpensation. Due to a lack of a proper legal structure to penalise smongfd 
conduct on theii- part, directors \vIio embezzle money beloilging to their 
companies by ancl large escape p~nishment."~ Ell~bezzlenle~lt is an easy and 
cost-efficient way for directors to eniich thenlsel~*es. U n d  such wrongdoing is 
properly penalised, performance-based colllpe~lsation \\ill not ellcourage 
cll-ectoss to behave responsibly Indeed, it is  argued that cven if peiforniance- 
based compcnsation was introduced, accounting figures could be manipulated 
to $ve a false picture of directo~ial pcrfon+~~~a~ice,  The solution is to make 
pcrfornlance-based conlpensation atn-actixre. Directors must judge that the 
benefits of working to em1 their con~pensation outweigh the act of misappi-o- 
pi-iating conlpany property to erliicll tl~emselses. This call only be done if a 
proper peiialty rcgkno to punish ~ r o n g f ~ d  coilduct is introduced. T k c  etl~ics of 
tlic accouiltillg arld audit professions nlust also be tightened so that d1e-y can 5x.e i i 111 
a credible measure of directorial performance. 1 is. 
I fc 
4. Role o f  Creditors in Corporate Governance j i ~ i  
g< It has also bceil suggestcci dint governance in government-owned corpoi-atioll? 1 XI 
call be unproved by issuing bonds to create a class of piivate imrestors to PI-o~ide i "i 1 c-1 
"'As with the state shareholder UI Chinese listed companies, sh,u.el~olding n~illistel-s in 
go\*en11ne11r-o\vi1ed corporations in Ausu-dk clo tiot invest their p~lr.ate lnolley UI the colpon>tiol~. 
Seco~lcUy, as with listed cornpatlies in Chiiia, the siixes of go~en~meilr-o\~~~~edd coi-po~ariorls 
cnililot be bought ant1 sold on stock markets, alrl so its board is iisulared f ion~ market press\ll-l: to 
I 
t 
perform well. Also, as t h e  rol-porarions do nor trade on the stock exchange, h e y  are not exl)osecl 1 :: 
to the forces irl the secutitias markets. Fulally, as wirh state represenmti\.es in srntc-ow~ecl 
' e l ~ t e ~ ~ ~ ~ i s e s -  L1 Zliina, sl:rut-!!:!~!ir:g :?~i~:irrr~-c-.i~1 . y \ x ~ ~ ~ ~ n ] t ~ ~ t : o i v ~ l r d  .>., rolpoltl5jo11s .. . do not 
thcnaelvcs have n fu~ancial i11tel.e~~ in the co~.poi-ation, so they ma?- be tenzpted to collabomre \\.ith-" 
the boarcl ro niisappropriate tlle =sets of rlie frill. See Fal-rar, s u p  n 1 1  1, 397-98. 
"" CA Scllipmli a ~ i d  JH Liu, "Cot~orste Govema~~ce irl China: Then and Now" (2002) Collr~~iBio atld 
RD E\vitlg, "Cliiiese Coi-pornte Gotenlarice ac~d Prospecrs for Reform" (2005) 1-i Joirn~oi $ 
Co~lit,r~~po~n!~' C!ririfl 3 17. 
Srildies suggest rkar fol- ever), four occurreiices of secu~iries crilne duee escape punishment. See 
i\,-i~ Xiao Liatlg, "A Srrldy o ~ i  the Pu~lisllmcnr of Securities Crime'' CoJi~x (Firznncc ili~gn:i~wj, 27 
Ji111e 2005 (in Clliilese). 
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probleills tliemselves. As a result, they are unable to discharge a monitoring role 
over their debtoi-s, Even worse, as insolvency legislation is not pl-operly enforced, 
clircctors iu debtor coi~~panies seldom fear that they would be replaced. Even if a 
company collapses, its directors may be hancled a better job if they e n j o ~ d  the 
s~il111ort of the inner circle of the Conlmunist Party or the government. 
Hypothetically, if directors of the debtor conipany can accumulate a substantial 
amount of personal wealth by enlbezzlement ~vithout bebig subjccr to 
punishment, would they really cni-e if they lost their jobs? AU state-o\v-ned balks 
currently have large anlounts of 11011-pelforming loans. They sunive because 
they car1 rely on the support of the government. This fact may make it difEcult 
for regulatoi-s to rely on b'anks to play a role in the governance of corporatised 
state-owned enterprises. If a Inore pi-oactit~e role for banks in col-porate 
governance is to be enco~uaged, the fwst step must be to Lnprot~ the g~\~crnaiice p1.c 
of the banks tllemselves.'" 
5. Idearning &om the Governance Experience in Transition i OI\ 
Economies j clis 
Follo~~ing the collapse of conln~uriisnl in 1989, ninny eastern European 
economies pilvarised tlieu. formcr state-owled enterprises in an effort to pronjote 
profit and efficiency and separate the state fi-om tlle enterprise secto~!'; Laws 
134 
were enacted to allow dflerent business mediums to be set up to cai.1-y oGt trade, 153 
eg limited liability conipa~iies, joint stock conipmies, ancl general and Ii~nited I 
partnersliips. State coiltrol over the emerging enteipi-ke sector was lifted a11d 
managers were encouraged to be con1petitis.e and pursue profit to increase the 
See rlie limited role rllat banks play ill Chinese corporate govelmance in C Law and P \Vo~ig, 
"Coi~'orate Go\-el~iat~ce: A Cornpal-ative hnalyis Benreen the UK and Cliula" (2005) 16 
Clay, "Debt as a Collrrol Device in Transitional Eco~~ornies: Tlle Esperie~lces or Hullgal)- alitl 
Polatld", JVol-lcl Bxrik Policy Research l\'orking Paper No 1480 @lie 1995), a\.ililablt: ac 
11ttp://ssm.con1/abstncr=604~904, accessed on 2 November 2005. 
13' See TG Xrun and JD Turner, "Corponre Governance of Banks hi Developing Economies: 
Concepts and Issues" (2004) 12 Copor,orn:e C ; ~ i ' i n i ~ : ~ c ~ :  An 611rnmfi0~1nl Rmi~w 37 1. 
L33 S Eswi~l, "Comnl~eririoa and Corporate Gorertlance in Transition" (2002) 16 Joumnl flE~o:mnlir 
Per~ec1ir.t~ 1 0 1 , 107. 
for shares in corporarioi~s.~~" Others solcl shares to t112 illalmgellleilt and 
cmplo).ees of the co i -p~ra t ion . '~~  Still otIiers sought to prkratise state-owned 
cnterpiises through auctior~ing them off to donlestic and foreign ir~~~estors. '~" 
Institutional shareholders such as pension funds and private in~estment 
a ions. companies were able to corlcel~tkate tlleir l~olclirlg in many corpnr t' 
Compared wit11 voucher privatisntioil and management and enl111.0y-ee buy-outs, 
prix~arisation through direct asset sales to external invcstol.~ resutltcd in the lllost 
corlceiltrated s l ~ a ~ e  ox<nership structures in corpoi-ations.13; Thc \vide range of 
piivatisation methods used led to different o ~ m e ~ s h i p  sti-uctures in tllc new 
employees (insidcr governance) or  dolllestic arld/or foreign investors (outsider 
economies struggle  dl llially u-eakncsses in their governance s);~tems.'j8 Their 
Fundame~i td  institutional arrai~gemer~ts under company law, such as the 
ow~lersluip is concentrated, the rights and interests of minority sl~xel~olders are 
'34 The Clzech Repc~blic used this ns the prinlaiy inerl~od. 
1" This ~vi l r ,  used ;~s rlle prirnaty pi%-arisatioii ~nedlocl in Poland, Romnnin, Slo~.enia, Slovakia and 
the Ukaioe. 
. 
Repulllic (domestic i~istitutions). See dso J Gillies, J Leimanil and R Peterson, "h1Aiilg a 
Successful Trai~ir ion fi.on~ a Conunlailcl to n hlru-ker Ecoiiomy The Lessoils from Esrollia" !200?) 
10 Co~pomle Goirnrnt~r~~ 175. 
1"" Jobbum ealid J Crotty, "Coiyorate Governalice in Transition Ecoiiomies: i\ Syi~tliesis of the 
Evideiicc", K.escarc11 Paper 0402 (Ja~iua-y 2004), 6, a\-ailable at Iltrp://~\~\~r~.al~s.astoi~.ac.~~k/ 
rie~\~rcb/resenrcli/pul~licntiot~/docs/F(P0402.pdf, accessed 011 1 June 2005. For a review of the 
corporate govematlce problems in Russia, Croatia ,and Hungary, see RIV hIcGee and GG 
Prcobragenska>a, "Corporate Goyel-natice in Ti.allsition. Economies: The Tlieoty and Practice of 
Corporate Governnrice in Eastein Europe" paper preseiitcd at the Global Conference on 
Croatia, preferred the German As is weU known, the Russian 
experience of inimicking Anglo-American governance 1x1s not been endrely 
successf~l.~.'-' Even for those econon~ies which adopted the German model of 
goverrlance, several deficiencies have hindered its successEd jmplenlemation. 
Supervisoiy boa-& have slacked it: the exercise of dlck legal obligations to the 
s11,u-eholders, and mailagenlent boards have exploited the conlpany a i d  
nlisappropriated its assets ro benefit thenlselves. bl many cases, du-ectors were . 
also majority shartholders ~ 1 l o  nlanaged dlc conlpany as they ~ i s h e d ,  ipoi-ing 
tlle inrerests of rnuiolity sharel~olders.'~~ 
It is argued that 0-ansition econoinics have simply rushed to subscribe to 
different governance models witllout frst csaininirlg whether the); were 
appropriate for their particulx social, histolical and political settings. Ll the 
majority of cases, the rudiments necessary to suppol? the operation of tllese 
med~anisms were either il~issing or ~nderdesreloped.~~~ In practice, privatisatio~i 
iiil~ co~~~pletcd q~~ickly and littlc coi~rideratioil r v u  given to ~vlletlier die The 
adoption of corporate go~~ernance mechanistns horn iuclusti-idised and 1 econ 
market-based economies ~rould engendei- posicive outcomes wllen applied in 
compal~ies still in tlle tl-ansition process. The assui~lption was vely mucli that 
legal r~lles and instirutio~ls xvould aiise "naturally" once rhe privarisation pr~ccss 
was complete. Tl i i ,  of course, has not happerled."+' It is al-gued thar.rna11): of the 
10 XIn:~~n~!t ,nt  1, 10--1 1 btrin,  ~ripm n 133, 112-13. 
Tllc Russian gox.ernlneiit. Cor esnmplc, retabled [nore r h a ~  20% of shmes h~ 57° ,~  ofprixatised 
fiinls aiid more t11al1 4OYb ofshwes in 14'0 of the fmls it privatisecl. See Esuin, rrqrm 11 133, 110. 
'* See, cg t l ~ e  Russi3n Cocle of Co~poi-ate Coven~nrice 2002 and the Liclepei~denr Director 
Code 2003 at htrp://%n$?v.l-icI.r~~ m ~ d  Ilrq1://r\?~~~-.inclepe11der1t~lir-ector.u respectively. Sce also 
hIcGee, and Prcobragei~kpa, s~iprtl it 132, 1-1-1 6 .  
"Corpomte Goyel-i~nce in Russia: IVhar AIoclel \\-ill It Follow?" (2004) I12 Corpordt Go;~enio~>ce, 
Pucko, ngrn n 140, 10. 
'IG Jobome a : ~ [  Crorty, srprn 11 139, 11-13 anclJV Salacuse, "Co~polxte Governallce ill the New 
Ccntuiy" (2004) 25 'The Corr$n~~v L t ~ ~ y n -  69, 83. 
It7 Jobome ailrl Croty, s!$m n 138, 13. 
Joumnl of Corl,ornte Low Siun'ics 
governarice problelzls currently experienced by transition econonlies ~rould  not 
habye occuii-ed had a more gradual approach to reforill beell a d ~ p t c d . ' " ~  
hglo-,.lllerican style corporate gossernance structures lilay not riecessarily wodc 
' 
w ~ l l  in econolllies wl~ere concerltrated ouaership structures u e  the rule rather 
colnpany decision making is s ~ o n g l y  fa\-~ured."~ 
Many ecorlonlists argue that transition ecorlolllies illust ret~u.11 to basics in 
reasse~sed. '~~ Od~crs  have proposed that transition ccononlies should develop an 
"shareholder focused" and dle nxi've belief on thc part of reforlllers in the 
's" 1 shareholder theory has led stakeholders to act 111 a non-cooperative mailnei-.151 i Directors iliust also become skilled at their role. For n-ially, this will nlean 
:o 1 learning to be flexible and ~villing to adapt and evolrc it1 cl~anging enlioi~rnents. 
:e 1 They illust also learn to rccopise oppoi-t[mities, mcet deinailds in a con~pctitis-e 
~e j enrirorimcnt md be able to devtlop ctTecti~~e monitoring a:ld govenlance 
systems. This change \+ill. be dramatic, not least because their esperience of 
communism has not equipped tllelll ~ti t l i  s~lflicient h~o~vledge  of I ~ T V  to do so. 
There are lessoils that Chinese reaplators can learn fioin the pris-atisation 
Chklese gavel-nment c a ~ ~ i e d  out the process of coi-poratisation on a large scale 
and ol,cr a relati~+ely sholt period. It 111ay be te l~~pt ing to press al~eacl wit11 
illtrocl~~culg more codes, enacting more 1a1b.s or  adopting Illore Ak~g~a- .h l~e r i ca~ l  
pracrices to proye to doluestic and global i11vesto1-s that China is ticking nll the 
must be adckessed ui-genfiy 
Fh-sc, attention sllould be paid to the proper enforcement of laxs in order co 
deter directors fi-om engaging 111 embezzlement. Misappropriation of conlpnny 
bring a rlellvative or securities action are p u ~  off by the lack of clality in the law 
rind the difficulties surrounding it. In the few cases tv1~el-e a 
sharrbolder has gone to  cow[, it is the conlpany that has  aid damages, not the 
directors. The penalties lvhicll llm-e been imposed on directors have also becn 
ridiculously Ienicnt, takin,a the for111 either of detlouncellle~lt or a &vial h e .  
Crinlind enforcerne~lt by the state against directors \vlio misappropriate 
company propert). is sporadic, notr\-itllstandiq its commoii occui-rellce. Tllere is 
dso  no authority such as tlle Deparcillerlt of Trade and Indusby x l d  the 
Financial Seiviccs A~~thor i ty  in the UE; which call investigate misappropriation 
and brhg an action against cbectors. Overall, the costs to cbeccors of misnppl-o- 
priatioll me snlall and they have litde fear that they be subject to 
The cI~,denge is thus to ensure that the public autholities, as well as the 
judiciay, have t l ~ e  xviU, i l i tegiv  and resources ro fulfil their l a ~ v  e ~ ~ f o l r e ~ l l e ~ l t  
duties. Until lxt\,s are enfo~-cecl pro13erl~ misappropriauoi1 of company propel-t)i 
will co~lcinue. Tlle irltl.ocluctio~l of ~lovel forms of govel-nnnce initiatives (see 
Table I), such as performance-based compellsation and govtrllarlce + crecbtol-s, 
xvo~dcl clo litde to enhance governance standarcls if a proper ellforcenle~it regime 
x<..;.re not establkilicd ancl if ihectoi-s belicved that no action would be talicn 
structures ~vllich enal~lecl tllc company to pelfor~ll best15%l mansition economics 
may also 1.1old valuable lessons for gotreroance in Cllina. Strtclies suggest that 
corporations which al-e gaternecl by outsiders (domestic institutions or foreign 
irlrrestors) pcifol-med better than those gover~lecl by jllsiders (its marlagemerit and 
emp10)-ecs). Studies also suggest that corpoi-ations o\\-ned predomixlantly by 
foi-eign iimestors performed better than corporations owned predomina~ldy- by 
dnmesric illstiturio!ls. 'Fpreiom L ->--. i~lvestors .:..- ... bavc introduced raclical changes to 
- ,.. - -  .---.".. I - '- - .-...-, .--.,,. 
enhance corporate governance t,idlin die co lTorac lo l~Xei i " l :~~ . f~~~t  - darms,d -: 
j53 Pel-fom~alice &\.as defined as coral fncrol- prociucri~iry, material cost per ulGt of revell::e ant1 labour 
p~'o[ilicri~ig~: see A Pivo.o\a~sky, "O\i.llnsllip Corrcer~trarioli and PerFonnarlcc hl Ukraine's 
Privacisecl Enteiylises" (2003) 50 LIIF S/(&Poprs 10 anrl iVL hleg-gl~son and JhI Nerter, .'Fi-on1 i 
State to hlnrket: A S u r e y  oF Empirical Stuclics on Privatisnrion" (2001) 39 j'o~~innl af E ~ o ~ l o r r ~ i c  
Li/c.tn/:~rr 321, hot11 cited altd c!iscussecl ill  Jobon~e and G~.otty, *$on 11 138, 4M.1 .  See also 
Fiatotcl~ev r t  d, ihirl, 33t2-49. 
ineficicnt boards, forced conlpanies to resti-ucture themselves and appointed 
their own iionlinees to sit on dle board.lS4 Along wit11 techllologicd h~;llo\v-hoy 
they have introduced morc knowledgeable and experienced persolinel. into the 
corposation. Tllese new reciuits ha\-e helpecl the corporation adapt to market 
forces and local and internal f r n ~  cor~ditioiis:~55 
"F01-t.igrn ownership arld control may impose stiirlgcr~t and rol~ust check on managerial 
discirtion mirl iinpl-oves the prospects for a successful restl~~cturiiig. . . outside investors 
tile fact that management has had little prior experience of effective leadersllip. 
directors to be entrepreneurial, curb \\.aste, and adhere to the law and gos-ern- 
"big four" national commei-cid banks, the CIlinese goverlliiient is ~lelconlirig 
sn-ategic foreign ins.cstoi-s". The Construction Bank of PRC recently 
sl~ould be opened fmther. The res~ictions on foreign i ~ l d u s t d  and financial 
cornpallies to llivest on the donlestic stock escllangcs sl~ould also be relased. 
15,'Sce N Barberis, h I  13o:,.cko, h l  Sllleifer a l~d  N Tsukanova. "Ho~t- Does Privatisation lVol.k? 
E~.itlence from the Russian Shops" (1996) 104~Jo111~d of Polifirtrl Erotrotr!v 764; N Uhlenbnlck and J 
De Cnstro, "Fol-eign Acquisitiolis LI Central and Eastern Europe: Ou~comes of Pri~atisation in 
Tmsitio~id Econo~nies" (2000) 43 dcdny of A~o11age11it7ztJo11ntnl 33 I ;  SX Znlm and G George, 
"Absoqhre Capacity: A Review, ReconceptuJintio~i and E~tension" (200'1) 27 2.1mden!v of 
.Ilnlmn;un~.12t Rmipic~lS5; and HK Steensma and AM Lyles, "Esplair~ing I J V  Sumival in -4 
. .. . . . . - - . . . . . ., . . .. . .. . 
Finally; we obsei~ed tllat dircctoi-s in Listed coillparlies are often appointed 
governing their behaviour. If conlpanies are to g o y  directors must become 
skilled at their role. They must learn to be conversaat with international -..: 
standncls of governance, llleet demands in a conlpetitive en\+onment and be 
able to develop effective n~onitorirlg and governance systems. Apart fi-0111 jud. 
welcoming fareign investol-s 'to s b a ~ c  their expertise ~vitll local directors, to i 
re,dators in China ought also to esrallish professional directorial associations in 1101 
order to set stallclards to guide directors and provide waining and education so rati 
they call discharge thcll- 1-esponsibilities effi~iently'~8 For example, tv-hilst best big; 
practice proxlsions hl non-legal codes provide that directors lllusr be responsible, ' i irsc 
cliligent and prudent, Chinese directors may not necessarily utlclerstand wlvhat j strll 
they entail in the busitless contesr. I , irlfl 
Other coune-ies in south cast Asia are takiug steps to ensure tllek chectors 
al-e properly equipped to lllariage the conlpany. In  I~falaysia, the listing rtdes OF 
the stock exchange were rcrised recently to require all clirectors of public listed 
conlpanies to undel-go mandatory accreditation progr-ammes with 01;aanisations 
who arc able to provide the relevant training that directors need.I5' I r k  addition, 
on a yearly basis, directors must pal-ticipate in a Cont~luing Eclucation 
Proganlnle (CEP).'" Both progranlmes seek to e~ll~allcc professiolidism 
aillongst directors and ixcrease their hon.ledge ancl uilcierstaildi~lg of recent 
developmellts in laws, regularion and business practices,'" pi-ln~ruily t l~i-o~igl~ 
providirlg training programmes on corporate governance matters. Man): 
organisations have been accredited with CEP points to aut l~oris~ then1 to 
conduct training programmes for directors.'" The requirement is that directors 
nlust accun~ulate a certain nrtmbei* of points ailnually so dley can pro\-e they 
understand tllek obligations and can kecp abreast of clevelopn~cnts i11 donlestic go- 
and iuternatio~ld corporate pmcrice.I6" / t i17 
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Charrered Accountants, the blain!-sinn Associatio~~ of tlle Irlsritute or Charrered Secretaries and 
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